Studies in Philosophy

The Mind-Body Problem

One of the most intriguing questions with which philosophers, psychologists, and scientists have struggled has to do with the relationship of the body and the mind. Are people merely physical machines who respond only to physical stimuli? Is there actually a mind that is distinct and separate from the body? Are minds capable of surviving the death of the body? Are we more than material objects? In this paper, I want to explore some of the questions regarding this issue. I will begin by overviewing the views of materialism and interactionism, then I will discuss the contemporary problem of "other minds," followed by a defense of my own position on this issue.

Materialism

Materialism is the idea that we are completely physical beings; there is no such thing as a mind that is distinct and separate from the body. Our nature is wholly physical, just as every other object in the universe. When the body ceases to function, we die — that is all. The concept of a soul or mind is mythical. Consequently, any view that accepts immortality or life after death is outdated and primitive. In the modern scientific era, we have outgrown the need for such views.

Science has shown, according to materialists, that every event, including those involved in the "mental" processes, may be explained in terms of matter and motion. Every bodily function and activity is a result of purely material sequences. There is no proof of, and no need for, any explanation that would factor in spiritual causes. Since everything can be explained by physical processes, and since there is a lack of proof for any cause that is not physical or material, then we should dismiss the idea that there is a such a thing as a mind that is distinct from the body.

In this view, one might have a tendency to describe humanity in terms of machinery. We are, basically, just machines (robots) that act and react based upon the physical stimuli to which we have been exposed. Interestingly, this itself has led to the question of whether or not machines, such as computers, can actually "think." Some argue that some computers already think on about the same level as human beings. I suppose this may be true, depending upon how one defines the idea of "thinking." However, if we factor in feelings and consciousness, which are also a part of our mental processes, I fail to see how machines "think" in the same way that humans think.

Dualism and Interactionism

Dualism is the concept that there are two elements that make up our being: body and spirit. The body, of course, is the material part; the other element is composed of what we typically call mind or spirit. The mind cannot be accounted for purely on the basis of materialism. It is distinct from the body and the brain. This is generally "proven" on the grounds of such reasoning as consciousness, purposiveness, and the ability to apprehend meaning. Even if a scientist could take apart all of the physical aspects of the brain, it would still be impossible to tell exactly what a person was thinking. The way in which the mind and the body function together is called interactionism. The mind has the ability to influence the body, and physical stimuli have the ability to influence the mind. An offshoot of this position is epiphenomenalism, which is the idea that physical stimuli can influence mental events, but mental powers cannot influence physical events. It is a one-way causal relation. The weakness of this is that it fails to explain why people’s thoughts have had such strong impact in the world.

The Problem of Other Minds

We are fascinated with personal identity. We make many efforts to try to "know" ourselves, or to "get in touch" with our own feelings. To be sure, I know that I have feelings. I know what it is like to be happy and sad; I know what it is to feel pain and pleasure. I know that I have thoughts, and those thoughts affect what I do and how I feel. The question to consider, however, is whether or not I can know that anyone else feels the same types of feelings and has the same kinds of thoughts. Is there anyone else who is actually a living being with feelings and thoughts like I am? That almost sounds like a silly question. Upon closer examination, however, it is interesting to note that we generally accept the idea that others do have "minds," but this acceptance is based upon inference and, if I may use the term, "faith." In other words, we trust that others feel and think based upon evidence that is less than scientific.

If people tell me that they are in pain, how do I know that they are really in pain? How do I know that what they are describing as "pain" is the same sensation that I feel when I think I am in pain? The same would be true of something that is pleasurable. There does appear to be varying degrees of pain and pleasure, but aside from this, the question remains, how do I know? I can infer, based someone’s actions, facial expressions, etc. that this person is experiencing what I understand to be pain. I can understand, based upon analogy with my own feelings, that this person is probably feeling something similar to what I call pain or pleasure, but that alone does not prove the case. The bottom line is that we simply have to "trust" that the other person feels the way that he or she describes it. If we find that the other person is a liar, then subsequent reports of how that person feels may no longer be trustworthy.

On a broader scale, how do I know that anyone else has a mind? It appears to me that other people have creative thoughts, similar feelings, consciousness, and all the things associated with being a living entity. Could it be that I am really imagining all of this? Am I really the only one who thinks and knows anything? If I am, how can I prove it? I know that these are the kinds of questions that we may philosophically dig into, but I must honestly say that such should ultimately drive us mad. I may be so bold as to say that I think that the existence of other minds is simply something that we know instinctively. We all have this universal experience of thinking, and we have to deal with others whom we perceive to think. We live in a personal existence wherein we all feel pain, joy, anger, and so on. We have conscious thoughts, and we act based upon them. We feel the necessity to treat other people, real or imaginary, in a way that reflects our "faith" that other people have minds. This is just the way our existence is, and someone who acts in a way that does not reflect this faith will suffer for it due to what we typically call selfishness. We simply accept the idea that people have minds a priori. Perhaps that is about all we can do; but it makes for the most pleasant existence.

Putting it Together

My view is, basically, that of interactionism. I am a dualist; I believe that we have minds that are distinct from our bodies. There are several reasons why I hold to this view, so I will touch upon some of them here.

I think that materialism is inadequate to account for the phenomenon we call "thinking." We might take a scientific look at the brain and try to describe all of its various functions, but ultimately none of our materialistic explanations can really account for why humans are able to think in the way they do. By "thinking" I mean the ability to conceive or form pictures and ideas in the mind. In our minds, we are able to produce thoughts, meditate, plan through, reason, expect, anticipate, remember, intend, purpose, form judgments and conclusions, feel various emotions, have opinions, etc. It simply seems an insufficient idea to say that all of these abilities are products of pure chance and brute materialism. To think that intelligence came from non-intelligence, and that rational abilities came from purely irrational physical sources, does not fit with what we know to be true in other areas of life. If I encounter a computer, I will automatically assume that someone with intelligence formed this machine and put within it the abilities to do what it does. I would be considered foolish to argue that the computer came about through chance processes devoid of any intelligent forerunner.

All of this sounds like the teleological argument for God’s existence, and, in essence, it is. Here, however, I am not arguing about purpose and design in the universe in general; I am arguing about the mind and intelligence. When people argue that everything exists through chance processes, and that no intelligence is responsible for our existence, then these same people are arguing that their own minds came about without any intelligence. Now I have to ask, if there is no purpose in the universe, and if our minds are not purposed in any way, then how can we trust what we think? By what logic do we suppose that anything we say or think, or the words that are written on any page, ultimately make any sense? Thinking assumes the existence of logic; but if there is no prior existence of logic, then how can we possibly know that we are able to think in a logical way? The very ones who argue against teleology condemn their own words to illogical rhetoric. If they deny this, then how can they prove otherwise. They have to assume the existence of design and logic if they want their own arguments to make sense. If they deny the existence of prior purpose, then to what standard of logic and design will they appeal to say that they make any sense? It is an argument without a foundation. All that we know about the creation of anything humans have made is that for something to be formed, it must first be formed within a mind.

Further, science must assume the existence of design. A materialist will argue for a "uniformity of law," but is this not, in itself, an argument for design? Studies in science are founded upon everything acting in a particular way. We expect gravity to always work and the "laws of nature" to be unwavering. I fail to see how this makes any sense at all unless there is intelligence and design as a foundation. Random chance is not so consistent. Without a consistent "pattern" in nature, science would be impossible.

Much more could be said about materialism, but I wish to move on to another important point about the existence of mind. I believe that the fact of consciousness and feeling argues for the existence of mind as distinct from the material body. Science has been unable to prove the idea that brute physical forces have been able to produce breathing, thinking, conscious, and feeling people. As Hunt argued, the "awareness of self" is something unique to the human mind. We can create computers that can "think" in a simulated way, but we cannot reproduce awareness and feeling. We can input archives of knowledge and information, and program computers to "spit out" the information much faster than we can recall it from our own memory, but we cannot teach a computer to feel pain when it is kicked, or have the ability to think "outside" of itself. It cannot look within itself to "get in touch" with its inner feelings. It cannot reason in matters of morality and make life-changing decisions. It simply is what we program it to be. We do not think of machines as having free will and moral responsibility. For that matter, we do not think of the animal kingdom in this way either. We humans are peculiar in that we place moral responsibility and free will decisions upon our own shoulders. I confess that this makes little sense to me if we are all just material machines destined to disappear from any existence.

Conclusion

I do not pretend to have all of the answers relative to the mind-body problem. I cannot scientifically prove the existence of mind by cutting open a brain and finding some "spirit-like" substance inside. Neither can we open a brain and see thoughts. We may see physical processes at work, but this says little about the thoughts, words, and pictures formed within one’s mind. Perhaps the best argument for the mind is instinctive. We know that we have thoughts, feelings, and consciousness. Who can rationally deny this? We assume the existence of logic by the very ideas we have and arguments we make. What material theory is adequate to describe why these things are so? Further, an admission that we do not know everything there is to know should, at the least, admit the possibility that there are some things that even science cannot explain.

Doy Moyer

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